Abstract: A model of taxation for cooperative n-person games is introduced where proper coalitions are taxed proportionally to their value. Games with non-empty core under taxation at rate e are a-balanced. Sharp bounds on e in matching games on (not necessarily bipartite) graphs are established. Upper and lower bounds on the smallest e in bin packing games are derived and euclidean random TSP games are seen to be, with high probability, e-balanced for e ~ 0.06.
I Introduction
For our purposes, a cooperative game is just a function v, the characteristic function of the game, that assigns to each coalition S ~_ N of a finite set N of players a real number v(S). We consider games where v(S) arises as the optimal value of a combinatorial optimization problem defined by S. Typically, "optimization" will mean "maximization" (e.g., matching, bin packing). In case of"minimization", we speak of a cost game (e.g., minimum spanning tree, traveling salesman). The discussion of minimization games is completely analogous to maximization games.
A solution concept tries to distribute the value v(N) of the grand coalition N among the individual players in an acceptable manner. Doubtless, the intuitively most attractive solution concept is the core of a game, which consists of those vectors x ~ ~N with component sum x(N) = v(N) and S-restricted component sum x(S) >_ v(S) for all S c N. Games with a non-empty core are balanced.
Unfortunately, many interesting games are not balanced. This means that one either has to introduce a completely different solution concept (e.g., Shapley value) or one has to modify the notion of"core". A model for the latter goes back to Shapley and Shubik [1966] . In that model, a proper coalition S c N is taxed by a constant e or with rate e proportionally to its size so that the value is reduced to v(S) -~ or v(S) -e IS[ resp.. Tijs and Driessen [1986] propose a tax proportional to the difference v(S) -~ v(i) . One now seeks a core vector in the taxed game, thereby trying to keep the tax(rate) e "small".
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In the present note, we suggest a model of taxation where the tax imposed on a proper coalition S c N is proportional to its value v(S). This is the usual idea behind a sales tax and, therefore, appears to be quite realistic. We thus reduce that value v(S) to (1 -e)v(S). A game with non-empty core after taxation with rate e is e-balanced. In this sense, e-taxation provides an e-approximation to balancedness.
In Section 2, we relate e-balancedness to the usual definition of balancedness via the analogue of Bondareva's [1963] and Shapley's [1967] theorem. The optimal e for matching games on arbitrary (possibly non-bipartite) graphs is determined in Section 3. Section 4 introduces bin packing games and derives (not sharp) bounds on the best e. Finally, we discuss traveling salesman games and argue that large euclidean game instances are, with high probability, e-balanced for e ~ 0.06.
e-Balancedness and e-Core Allocations
In this section, we introduce the notion of e-balanced games and the e-core of a game. Arguing along the same lines as in Bondareva [1963] and Shapley [1967] , we conclude that e-balanced games are characterized by the existence of nonempty e-cores (Theorem 1 below).
Let the cooperative game v with the set N of players be given by its characteristic function
where v(~b) = 0. Denoting by ls the indicator function of an arbitrary coalition S _~ N, we say that v is e-balanced for e > 0 if for all $1, $2, ..., Sk c N and
The e-core K~(v) of v consists of all allocation vectors x ~ EN such that
where, as usual, x(S) = ~, x(i).
itS
Our first result seemingly extends the theorem of Bondareva and Shapley (the case e = 0 in our notation). Actually, it is easily seen to be equivalent to that theorem by considering the game v~: 2 N -o R, where
We therefore only sketch the simple direct proof. Rather than verifying the condition for e-balancedness directly, Theorem 1 allows us to exhibit allocation vectors in the e-core instead. We will now turn our attention to the study of e-balancedness of some combinatorial games that are known to be generally not O-balanced.
Before doing so, we want to relate our z-core with the z-tax core of Tijs and Driessen [1986] that consists of those vectors x e ~N with the properties
It is not hard to find games with empty e-tax core but non-empty e-core. Indeed, for non-negative games, the e-core is a more general solution concept. On the other hand, both concepts coincide for games v with v(i)= 0 for each i e N.
Examples of the latter are the matching games in Section 3.
A vector x e R N is an imputation for the game v is x distributes v(N) and is individually rational, i.e., if
Note that any vector in the e-tax core is an imputation while the e-core may contain also vectors that are not individually rational. In the games we consider below, however, we will always exhibit imputations in the z-core.
Matching Games
Let G = (N, E) be a graph on the vertex set N with the set E of edges. We assume that G is (edge-) weighted via w:E~N .
Thinking of N as a set of players, define the value v(S) of the coalition S _ N in the matching game v relative to w by
v(S) = max {w(M)[M c_ E(S) matching} , where E(S) is the set of edges joining two vertices in S. (Recall that a matching in G is a set of pairwise disjoint edges).
It is well-known that the matching game is O-balanced if the graph G is bipartite, i.e., if G contains no circuit of odd length > 3 (cf. Shapley and Shubik [1972-1) . On the other hand, there are matching games with empty O-core (take G to be triangle with w = 1). Relaxing the integrality constraints x e ~ {0, 1} to 0 < xe < 1, we obtain the associated linear program LP(S), whose optimal value we denote by g
(S). Clearly v(s) >_ v(S).
The game ~ is a linear production game in the sense of Owen [1975] and hence has a non-empty O-core. Proof: We use the fact (cf. Lovfisz and Plummer [1986] , Chap. 7) that the linear program LP(S) has an optimal solution x ~ R E such that for all e ~ E, x~=O or x~= 89 or x~=l .
Moreover, the set {e ~ Elxe = 89 is a union of a disjoint circuits of odd length.
Let C be such a circuit. The contribution of C towards ~(S) is 1
~" y~ w(e). e~C
We claim that C contains a matching M of weight
(1), 
w(e)-w(m) > 2 w(e)----2 w(e)
2 ~c -2~c 21c1~c
_1 1
Thus, by replacing all odd circuits C with Xtc = 89 by an appropriate matching, we obtain a matching in S with weight at least (i-~) ~(S).
[] We remark that Theorem 2 is "best possible". It is straightforward to see that the cardinality matching game (i.e., w -1) on an odd circuit of length k is 1 not e-balanced for any e < ~.
Corollary 4: (cf. Shapley and Shubik [1972] ): If G is bipartite, then the matching game is balanced.
[]
Bin Packing Games
We introduce the following combinatorial game: There are n items of sizes ax, .. We first show that we cannot guarantee e-balancedness for general bin packing games unless e > -~.
Proposition 5: Let e _> 0 be such that every bin packing game is z-balanced. Then e~.
Proof: Take 2 bins with capacity bl = bl = 2 and 5 items of size al = a 2 = t ! t l+6, al=a2=a3=lforsome0<6<l.
Consider the coalitions S, = {b 1, a~, a~}, S 2 = {b 2, a~, a~}, S 3 = {bl, b 2, al, a2, a~, a~} and $4 = {al, a2}. Case 1: a > v(N) (i.e. the grand coalition is short of truck drivers).
We allocate nothing to the item owners and assign to truck driverj the value
x~= v(N).
We must show that x(S) > 89 holds for any coalition S in the bin packing game. This will follow once we can demonstrate that there is an optimal bin packing in which every bin is at least half full because then v(N) > 89 and so 1 1
x(S)>~ ~, bj> j~s _ -2 v(S).
Consider an optimal bin packing and suppose bin j is less than half full. Because a > v(N), there is an item as that is not in any bin. Because the current packing is optimal, we have a t _> 89 On the other hand, a t _< bj (the fundamental assumption in our model) implies that we would improve the current solution by replacing the content of bin j with as.
Case 2: a = v(N).
In this case, we assign nothing to the truck owners and allocate to the owner of item i the value
This allocation obviously satisfies x(S) > v(S) for any coalition S, []
Our results show that the smallest e for which every bin packing game is e-balanced lies between 1/7 and 1/2. Are there sharper bounds? It should also be interesting to study the bin packing game in a more general framework where at < bj does not necessarily hold and the profit p~ gained from packing item as may be independent from its size.
TSP Games
TSP games ("Traveling Salesman" games) can be motivated by a repairman who starts from his home 0 and visits the customers N = { 1 ..... n} before returning home (cf. Tamir [1989] and Potters et al. [1992] ). Hence we consider a graph G on the vertex set N w {0} whose edges correspond to links connecting customers.
Each link e is weighted by its (non-negative) length d(e). Taking N to be a set of players, the associated TSP game evaluates the cost c(S) of any coalition S ___ N as c(S) = length of a shortest tour through S u {0} .
We seek to distribute the total cost c(N) of the grand coalition among the players N. Similarly to the foregoing, we define the e-core K,(c) of the cost 9ame c to consist of all vectors x ~ ~N such that
In the model we discuss in this section, we will assume throughout that the graph G is undirected and that the edge lengths satisfy the triangle inequality. Without going into details, let us remark here that one can exhibit an example of a TSP game with empty O-core whose underlying graph satisfies the above requirements (Tamir 1-1989] ).
In fact, there are even euclidean TSP games with empty O-core (Faigle and Kern [t993] ). (Recall that a euclidean TSP game, by definition, arises from choosing the vertex set in the plane •" and considering the euclidean distances between pairs of points (see also below)).
In the following, we denote by L = v(N) the length of the shortest tour and by T the length of a minimum spanning tree in G.
Theorem 7: IfL < (1 + e)T, then the TSP game c has a non-empty e-core.
Proof: The MST ("Minimum Spanning Tree") game ~ associated with G is given by ~(S) = length of an MST on S u {0} .
It is well-known that ~ has a non-empty O-core (cf. Claus and Kleitman [1973] ). 
x(S) = z(s) L <_ ~(S)(l + ~) <_ (1 + ,)c(S) .
[] Note that L < 2T always holds since a (in general non-optimal) tour can be constructed by the following standard procedure: double the edges of the optimal tree in order to obtain an eulerian graph on N u {0}. Trace the eulerian tour of length 2T and take "shortcuts" using the triangle inequality. There results a tour of length _< 2T.
In many situations, the e in the hypothesis of Theorem 6 is quite small. Consider, for example, the euclidean TSP and let U := [0, 1] 2 be the unit square with center Xo = ( 89 1) ~ U. Choose xl, ..., x, e U and define G = (V, E) to be the complete graph on V = N u {0} with edge lengths
It is known that with high probability L ~ 0.72x/n and T ,~ 0.68v/n (cf. Kern [1989] , Rhee and Talagrand [1989] , Steele [1990] , Goemans and Bertsimas [1991] ). More precisely, it has been shown that there exist constants /~r and/~r such that for independent, uniformly distributed random variables XI, X2, ... become exponentially small as n ---, oo for any fixed ~t > 0. Numerical experiments (Goemans and Bertsimas [1991] ) suggest that flL "~ 0.72 and fir ~ 0.68. L < 1.06 T with high probability, which guarantees an e-core with e ,~ 0.06.
Another possible allocation rule for the TSP game is motivated by the following relaxation of the TSP problem. As above, let c/j denote the distance between nodes i and j. Define, for each coalition S _ N Obviously, any optimal tour through S w {0} satisfies these constraints (so called "degree constraints" and "subtour elimination constraints"). As observed already by Tamir [1989] , [1991] and others, the game defined by g has nonempty core. (In fact, a vector 2 in the core of this game can be computed efficiently.) If is a vector in the core of the game defined by g, then L
x(i) := Y:(i).a(N) ,
(where, again, L denotes the length of an optimum tour through N w {0}) defines an allocation for the TSP game. Obviously, . L _ L 1
x(S) < x(S).~ <_ c(S).--(~ < c(S). (X~ )
It has been shown by Wolsey [1980] that the ratio L/?(N) is at most 3/2, assuming the triangle inequality for the distances c u. Thus, this allocation rule yields a vector x in the 89 of the TSP-game. It has been conjectured that the above ratio is bounded by 4/3. In the euclidean case, empirical results on random problems with uniformly distributed points in the unit sqare seem to imply that, on the average, c(N) >_ 0.70" x/~ , (cf. Goemans andBertsimas [1991] ). Thus, with high probability, a random TSP game has nonempty e-core even for 0.72 ~ --~ 0.03 . 0.70
